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Income, interdependence, and substitution eﬀects
aﬀecting incentives for security investmentKjell HauskenAbstractFirms in cyber war compete with external intruders such as hackers over their assets.
Each ﬁrm invests in security technology when the required rate of return from security
investment exceeds the average attack level, or when the formal control requirements
dictate investment. Each ﬁrm invests maximally in security when the average attack
level is 25% of the ﬁrm’s required rate of return. The income eﬀect eliminates or
‘‘freezes’’ parts of the agent’s resource, attack tools, and competence. The security
investment decreases in the income reduction parameter when the agent’s resource is
low, is inverse U shaped when the resource is intermediate, and drops to zero when
the external threat is overwhelming. A suﬃciently strong income eﬀect eliminates the
external threat. When two ﬁrms are interdependent, security investments and attacks
impact both ﬁrms. With increasing interdependence, each ﬁrm free rides by investing
less, suﬀers lower proﬁt, while the agent enjoys higher proﬁt. The substitution eﬀect
causes the agent to allocate his attack optimally between the ﬁrms. The attack distribu-
tion is endogenized. Each ﬁrm’s security investment increases in its asset and investment
eﬃciency. The attack against each ﬁrm increases in the product of the ﬁrm’s asset and
investment ineﬃciency. Speciﬁc analyses are made of how the substitution eﬀect impacts 
security investment for diﬀerently sized ﬁrms.Keywords: Cyber war; Conﬂict; Contest success function; Security technology investment; Security
breaches; Income; Interdependence; Substitution
1. Introduction
The intensity of cyber war has increased through the Internet revolution.
Firms are bombarded with attacks of all kinds, and invest increasingly in secu-
rity technology. A variety of principles are applied to determine the size of the
investment. The common approach in today’s literature is to assume that the
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 external threat is ﬁxed and immutable. This means that the nature of cyber
war is not fully appreciated. This article develops a model that accounts for
the cyber war between ﬁrms as strategic players on the one hand and the exter-
nal threat phrased as a strategic player on the other hand. None of the warring
sides are ﬁxed and immutable. They adapt to each other. Available resources by
all players, and strategic choices, depend on all strategic choices and the nature
of cyber war. As developed in the conﬂict and rent seeking literature, the ﬁrms
and the external agents wage war over the ﬁrms’ assets. This approach has not
been made earlier in this literature, and generates new and interesting insights.
Three eﬀects which with a few exceptions are ignored in today’s literature
are discussed. The income eﬀect eliminates parts of the external agent’s
resource, or weakens the agent’s ability to convert resources into an attack,
which reduces the attacker’s overall ability or willingness to conduct cyber
war. The interdependence eﬀect means that two ﬁrms in varying degrees are
intertwined, dependent, and inﬂuenced by each other, so that one ﬁrm’s secu-
rity investment beneﬁts both ﬁrms, and the attack on one ﬁrm also aﬀects the
other ﬁrm. The substitution eﬀect causes the external agent to consider the
ﬁrms’ strategies and substitute into the most optimal and least costly attack
allocation across the two ﬁrms. The three eﬀects cause quite diﬀerent optimal
strategies regarding security investment and information sharing for ﬁrms.
The article describes the external agent as hackers or perpetrators intending 
to break through the security of ﬁrms to get access to assets. The model is 
phrased as cyber war, but applies for all kinds of external agents with hostile 
intentions directed towards appropriating ﬁrms’ assets. Examples are terror-
ists, crime syndicates, thieves, proletarians, and various agencies, ﬁrms, or 
other actors engaged in asset appropriation. Firms in cyber war are well advised
to apply competitor analysis (Porter, 1980), adopted to information security by
Gordon and Loeb (2001), and which may be adopted further to the competition
or war between ﬁrms and external attackers. We consider attackers as
competitors. Attackers come in all shapes and forms, many are unknown, and their
skills and objectives diﬀer. See Kjaerland (2005) for a clas-siﬁcation of computer
security incidents. Gordon and Loeb (2001, p. 73) argue that, ‘‘once your
competitors have been identiﬁed, the next move is to determine the type of
information about your ﬁrm that competitors would ﬁnd most beneﬁcial’’.
 Gordon and Loeb (2003) provide a formal model of how two rivals invest in
competitor analysis and information security. Competitor analysis enables a 
ﬁrm to capture a portion of the market’s proﬁts currently earned by the rival. 
Information security involves e.g. reducing the threat that the ﬁrm’s 
information system will be breached by the ﬁrm’s rival or by others. In this 
article we assume that competitor analysis and information security operate 
jointly. Firms apply competitor analysis when adjusting the size and kind of 
security investments to protect assets, and external agents apply com-petitor 
analysis when adjusting their attacks to appropriate assets.
Firms’ incentives to invest in security technology are inﬂuenced not only by 
external agents, but also by law. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) places 
strict requirements on ﬁrms. Especially, the internal control provisions of Sec-
tion 404 of SOX require senior management of publicly traded companies both 
to (i) establish and maintain adequate internal controls for ﬁnancial reporting, 
and (ii) assess annually the eﬀectiveness of those controls. Furthermore, the law 
establishes attestation requirements for public accounting ﬁrms to assess man-
agement’s certiﬁcation of the eﬀectiveness of its internal controls over ﬁnancial 
reporting. Bagby (2005) argues that a conﬂuence of SOX, privacy law, national 
and institutional security, and trade secrecy, jointly and reinforcingly place 
pressures for internal control progress on various functions (ﬁnance, account-
ing, IT, eCommerce and internet Services) within ﬁrms and across industries 
and professions. The assumption is that control systems are the key security 
methods for information assets, which are pathways to other assets. Dhillon et 
al. (2004, p. 551) argue ‘‘that organisations which focus exclusively on tech-nical 
and formal control measures in their systems fall short of protecting their 
resources’’. They propose ‘‘that organizations should focus more on the prag-
matic control measures’’ ‘‘related to good management practices and manage-
ment communication’’.
In our framework, ﬁrms have incentives to abide by the formal control
requirements directed by law if the beneﬁts of such compliance exceed the
costs, which is always the case when the ﬁnes and sanctions for non-compliance
are large. Firms abide by the pragmatic control requirements directed by cul-
ture, custom, good management practices, and other concerns to the extent the
beneﬁts outstrip the costs. Examples of costs are loss of reputation and custom-
ers, which reduce the ﬁrms’ assets. As we will see, there are cases where ﬁrms
have no incentives to invest in security, such as when the required rate of return
is lower than the average level of attack, or the threat is tremendous. This
presupposes that no formal control requirements dictate investment, while
pragmatic control measures may or may not exist. That is, with regulation the
ﬁrms always have to invest in security to comply with the formal control
requirements, while without regulation the ﬁrms have incentive not to invest
in some cases. Formal and informal control measures to some extent have
the same impact as external agents in the sense that ﬁrms’ assets are reduced
unless ﬁrms invest suﬃciently in security either to comply with the control mea-
sures, and/or to prevent the external agents from appropriating their assets.
Section 2 discusses a few characteristics of today’s literature. Section 3 
develops the benchmark model with no eﬀects, and attacks against n diﬀerent 
ﬁrms. Section 4 analyzes the income eﬀect and attacks against n equivalent 
ﬁrms. Sections 5 and 6 consider the interdependence eﬀect and substitution 
eﬀect for two diﬀerent ﬁrms. Section 7 considers the joint operation of the 
interdependence and substitution eﬀects. Section 8 analyzes the joint operation 
of all the three eﬀects. Section 9 considers future research and limitations of the 
current work. Section 10 concludes.2. A few characteristics of today’s literature
Although the model in this article conﬁnes attention to security investment,
the strategic complementarity of security investment and information sharing
is such that it is useful to consider the intertwined literatures of both. Some
recent papers discuss security based information sharing organizations. Schenk
and Schenk (2002) illuminate incentives for reporting security breaches, Camp-
bell et al. (2003) and Cavusoglu et al. (2004) consider the cost and impact of
security breaches, and Schechter and Smith (2003) analyze the beneﬁts of shar-
ing information to prevent information security breaches. Gal-Or and Ghose
(2003) analyze how market characteristics aﬀect information sharing and secu-
rity investment which in turn aﬀect demand and costs. Gal-Or and Ghose (2005)
present a two stage Bertrand-Nash model where ﬁrms choose security
investment, information sharing, and prices, focusing on demand side eﬀects.
Gordon and Loeb (2002) determine the optimal investment for information
protection. Gordon et al. (2003) focus on the cost side eﬀects of how informa-
tion sharing aﬀects the overall level of security, where free-riding may cause
under-investment in security. The free-rider dilemma is further analyzed by
Anderson (2001) with respect to security investments, Varian (2002) related to
system reliability, and Hausken (2002) regarding how agents incur costs in
various games to ensure system reliability. Ziv (1993) shows that truth telling
may not be an equilibrium.
The analysis of information sharing in the cyber war era can draw upon the
general literature on cooperative relationships, joint ventures, and trade asso-
ciations (Gal-Or, 1985; Kirby, 1988; Novshek and Sonnenschein, 1982; Shap-
iro, 1986; Vives, 1990). The latter typically considers a two stage game where
information is ﬁrst shared and then the ﬁrms compete (Bertrand or Cournot)
without collusion in the product market. E.g., Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) let in
the ﬁrst stage two ﬁrms choose security investment and information sharing
simultaneously. In the second stage the two ﬁrms choose prices simultaneously.
The second stage is solved ﬁrst, which gives prices dependent on all the four
ﬁrst stage decision variables. Inserting the prices into the ﬁrst stage gives an
optimization problem where both ﬁrms choose positive security investment
and information sharing. The problem with this approach is that each ﬁrm
chooses information sharing in the ﬁrst stage taking into account how the price
it chooses optimally in the second stage depends on information sharing by
both ﬁrms. This means that the information sharing chosen by the other ﬁrm
has a direct impact on the information sharing chosen by the ﬁrst ﬁrm. This
direct impact is questionable since it reduces the incentive each ﬁrm has to free
ride on the other ﬁrm’s information sharing. Each ﬁrm prefers to receive infor-
mation from the other ﬁrm, but does not necessarily have an incentive to pro-
vide information. Consequently, Gal-Or and Ghose’s (2005) two stage game,
and other games in the literature, are designed such that the free rider dilemma
is partly eliminated.
Alternatives to the typical two stage game are a one stage game where all six
decisions are made simultaneously, or a two stage game where the decisions are
sequenced diﬀerently, or a three stage game. Security investments diﬀer from
the other decisions in that they require planning, sustained eﬀort through time,
involving buildup of infrastructure, culture, and competence. Hence security
investments in the ﬁrst stage seem plausible. Information sharing and prices
(or quantities) can be determined in the second stage, simultaneously and inde-
pendently, or in the second and third stages. All these alternatives give six ﬁrst
order conditions which may give illuminating results that can be tested for
robustness and other characteristics.1
The main shortcomings of today’s literature are that the external threat is
considered to be ﬁxed and immutable in quantity and quality, directed in a
ﬁxed and immutable manner against each ﬁrm, and does not depend on the
kind of interaction between the ﬁrms. This article intends to overcome these
three shortcomings.
Let us consider a cyber war between ﬁrms on the one hand seeking to defend
assets, and external agents on the other hand as an external threat seeking to
attack assets. The number of external agents, their resources, competence,
and objectives are not ﬁxed and immutable. The two warring sides adapt to1 The author has set up some of the six FOCs for the Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) model with the
given functional forms, additionally accounting for the contest success function developed in
Section 3, and the income, interdependence, and substitution eﬀects. The FOCs typically cover half
a page which means that the implicit function approach cannot be used and one would have to rely
on simulations to gain insights.
each other. As ﬁrms invest in security technology, and share information, parts
of the resources and competence of the external agents may become obsolete.
This eliminates parts of the external threat. If the cyber war grows too intense,
some of the external agents may give up, may change into other activities, or
may change objectives. Some may invest to develop new competence, which
is costly and time consuming. Others may explore new avenues of attack which
may or may not prove successful. Firms’ investments may thus permanently or
temporarily reduce the external threat. This may beneﬁt some ﬁrms in partic-
ular, or all ﬁrms in general.
If one ﬁrm, in terms of quantity, quality, and nature, invests otherwise in
security technology, and share information otherwise than another ﬁrm, exter-
nal agents can be expected to attack the ﬁrms diﬀerently. That is, the external
threat faced by each ﬁrm depends on the strategic choices made by that ﬁrm,
and the strategic choices made by other ﬁrms.
Two ﬁrms may operate in diﬀerent markets and be relatively independent,
they may operate in the same market through market sharing, they may be
strong competitors in the same market, they may depend on each other
through vertical integration, outsourcing, or other cooperative arrangements,
or they may be so strongly interconnected that an attack on one is tantamount,
in varying degrees, to an attack on the other. These kinds of interaction
between ﬁrms inﬂuence the cyber war and strategic choices of both ﬁrms and
external agents.
The income eﬀect has to the author’s knowledge been considered twice ear-
lier related to terrorism.2 First, Enders and Sandler (2003) mention the possi-
bility of ‘‘freezing terrorist’s assets’’ which ‘‘reduces their ‘war chest’’’. Second,
Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002, p. 10), who also use the term deterrence eﬀect,
consider public intervention versus self-protection and show that ‘‘protection
reduces the payoﬀ to terrorism’’. The interdependence eﬀect has been consid-
ered by Kunreuther and Heal (2003), where one target’s defense beneﬁts all tar-
gets. Examples occur within the airline industry, computer networks, ﬁre
protection, theft protection, bankruptcy protection, vaccinations. The substitu-
tion eﬀect has been considered twice earlier. First, Enders and Sandler (2003)
refer to ‘‘the installation of screening devices in US airports in January 1973
<which> made skyjackings more diﬃcult, thus encouraging terrorists to substi-
tute into other kinds of hostage missions or to stage a skyjacking from an air-
port outside of the United States’’. Second, Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002, 10),
who also use the term displacement eﬀect, state that ‘‘with the total level of
terror investments ﬁxed at T, increases in self-protection by one target cause
terrorists to substitute toward other targets. . .  Each target’s probability of2 I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for referring me to Lakdawalla and Zanjani
(2002).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 attack falls with its own self-protection, but rises with the self-protection
investments of others’’. The objective of this article is to consider how these
three eﬀects operate in cyber war related to security investment.
Let us look more closely at the Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) model. Although
market characteristics, consumer demand, and sensitivity toward price and
quantity of course depend on the strategic choices of the two ﬁrms, the nature of
the external threat is ﬁxed and immutable. In their Proposition 3(i) they ﬁnd that
‘‘a lower level of ﬁrm loyalty leads to lower levels of security information sharing
and security technology investment’’. Other models may show that the only way
out of low ﬁrm loyalty is higher investment in security and e.g. publi-cized
demonstrated participation in information sharing alliances, to build con-sumer
conﬁdence. In their Proposition 3(ii) they ﬁnd that ‘‘the extent of information
sharing and amount of security technology investment by both ﬁrms increase
when the degree of product substitutability increases’’. Increased com-petition
generally causes price cuts. As ﬁrms’ surplus decrease due to price cuts, the
opposite result may follow where less may get invested in security, and infor-
mation sharing may be too risky. In their Proposition 4(i) they ﬁnd that ‘‘security
information sharing and security technology investment levels increase with ﬁrm
size,’’ which is ‘‘consistent with the well known result that a monopolist beneﬁts
more from cost-reducing innovations than a ﬁrm competing in a duopoly, given
that it can extract a higher proportion of the surplus from the market’’. In an
industry with one strong dominant ﬁrm and one weak inferior ﬁrm, this result is
questionable. Frequently, the strong ﬁrm may not trust the weak ﬁrm and may
refuse to share information with it. Fearing exploitation, the weak ﬁrm may also
be reluctant to share information. Further, if the competence of the external
agents is too low to attack the strong ﬁrm, the weak ﬁrm may get attacked,
leading the weak to invest more than the strong as a percentage of ﬁrm size. Both
Gal-Or and Ghose’s (2005) and Gordon et al.’s (2003) models are highly valuable
contributions, but it should be realized that they make speciﬁc assumptions.
Future research needs to question and develop also alternative assumptions to
allow for comparison. This article is one such alternative.
Analyzing incentives for security investment should be supplemented with
analyzing incentives for learning and acquiring information about how to
invest wisely.3 This permits better understanding of the pressures, drivers
and mechanisms involved when deciding how to invest. Some incentives to
learn might include (thus could be modeled): 1. Information of industry-perva-
sive vulnerability may enable remediation at competitor/supplier/customer/ser-
vice organization. 2. Learning may counteract the market perception that
vulnerability is pervasive across industry or corporate functions (e.g. IT,
accounting, human resources). 3. One may learn to exploit competitive3 I thank John Bagby for pointing out the relevance of learning.
advantage, and thus correct the market misperception, that vulnerability is per-
vasive, which may ensure competitive advantage over vulnerable ﬁrms. 4. One
may learn to exploit vulnerability to misappropriate conﬁdences (data, secret
theft). 5. One may try to model the amount of information about security
investment not accurately received, misunderstood, and misinterpreted.3. The benchmark model: no eﬀects, ﬁxed resource R, ﬁxed distributed attack bi
Firm i has an asset ri, i = 1, . . . ,n, and there are n ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm i invests ti
in security technology to defend its asset, where ti is the security investment
cost, which we refer to as the investment. The security investment expenditure
is fi, where ofi/oti > 0. We consider the simple case f
i = citi, where ci is the inef-
ﬁciency of security investment for ﬁrm i.4 Higher ci means greater ineﬃciency,
where 1/ci is the eﬃciency. (ci may alternatively be interpreted as the unit cost
of security investment, where ti does not have to be discrete.) Firm i employs
security experts, installs ﬁrewalls, applies encryption techniques, access control
mechanisms, develops intrusion detection systems, and designs the optimal
defense. External agents, which we for simplicity consider as one unitary agent,
mount attacks against the ﬁrms. The external agent (henceforth simply agent)
has a resource R which is transformed into an investment T directed as an
attack against all ﬁrms. The ineﬃciency of the transformation is a, and the eﬃ-
ciency of the transformation is 1/a. (a may alternatively be interpreted as the
unit transformation cost.) Firms and agent are assumed risk neutral.5 Both4 I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for referring me to Dalvi et al. (2004) and pointing
out that ‘‘one can easily envisage a scenario where the costs of investments in security for a ﬁrm 
increase proportionally with the level of attack investments made by the external agency because 
every additional unit of investment is now that much less ‘eﬀective’ because of a corresponding 
investment in T by the adversary’’. The security investment expenditure would then be fi = citiTi. 
To compare with the alternative scenario, assume that the purchase and installation of a given 
ﬁrewall cost x dollars. This cost is ﬁxed regardless of how many attempt to break through it, and 
regardless of how many succeed in breaking through it. This gives a security investment expenditure
citi. Dalvi et al.’s (2004) approach is philosophically related to assuming the expenditure citiTi. The 
diﬀerence between their approach and the approach in this article is that Dalvi et al. assume no 
contest success function for the competition between Classiﬁer and Adversary. With a contest 
success function hi = ti/(ti + Ti), and an expenditure citiTi, the attack Ti by the agent on ﬁrm i has a 
double impact. The ﬁrst impact is to increase ﬁrm i’s security investment expenditure. The second 
impact is to reduce ﬁrm i’s share hi of the asset ri. As is common in the economic conﬂict literature 
and in the war literature, and to avoid the double impact, this article conﬁnes attention to the 
second impact, which gives the expenditure fi = citi.
5 An alternative analysis may assume that the agent as an attacker is risk seeking while the ﬁrms 
as defenders are risk averse. Assuming risk neutrality simpliﬁes the analysis. Much of the economic 
conﬂict literature related to production, appropriation, defense, and rent seeking assumes risk
neutrality. See Skaperdas (1991) for an exception.
the expenditures citi and aT can be capital and/or labor. A fraction bi of the
attack is directed as Ti at ﬁrm i, that is,
T ¼ R=a; T i ¼ biT ;
Xn
i¼1
bi ¼ 1: ð1Þ
The agent’s attack T is constant in this simplest model. If bi is also constant,
Ti is constant and the agent has no optimization problem. Examples of con-
stant bi are bi = 1/n and bi ¼ ri=
Pn
i¼1ri. The agent’s objective is to get a frac-
tion of the ﬁrms’ assets.6 The agent seeks to break through the security 
defense of the n ﬁrms in order to appropriate, get access to, or conﬁscate,
something of value in the ﬁrms, or secure information which can be used
as means of appropriating fractions of the ﬁrms’ assets. The appropriation
may be money if the ﬁrm’s bank accounts can be hacked, assets that can
be converted into money, anything of value controlled by the ﬁrm, secure
information which may be used to the ﬁrm’s disadvantage, or information
that can be used to blackmail the ﬁrm. Merely announcing credibly with Ti 
to a ﬁrm that it will be hacked unless it pays may be enough to secure a frac-
tion of the ﬁrm’s assets. The investment Ti can also be used to get informa-
tion from ﬁrm i which can be used to get something of value elsewhere. This
may for ﬁrm i cause competitive disadvantage, bad publicity, or some other
eﬀect which indirectly reduces ﬁrm i’s asset ri. We assume that the cyber war 
between ﬁrm i and the agent for the asset ri takes the form that is common in the 
conﬂict and rent seeking literature (Hausken, 2005; Hirshleifer, 1989;
Skaperdas, 1996), where ﬁrm i gets a fraction hi, and the agent gets the 
remaining fraction 1  hi, where hi is the contest success function, ohi/
oti > 0 , oh
i/oTi < 0. We shall use the common ratio formula
7
hi ¼ ti
ti þ T i : ð2Þ
Summing up, ﬁrm i invests ti in security technology at an expenditure f
i, and
gets to keep a fraction hi of its asset ri in cyber war with an agent who invests
Ti. Firm i’s proﬁt ui and the agent’s proﬁt U are
ui ¼ titi þ T i ri  citi; U ¼
Xn
i¼1
T i
ti þ T i ri  aT : ð3Þ
Whereas each ﬁrm has a variable expenditure citi, the agent has a ﬁxed expen-
diture aT = R which can be conceived of as a budget constraint. There are
several reasons for this. First, ﬁrms are often (but not always) more resourceful6 This objective can be interpreted as ﬁnancial gain. Other possible objectives are political gain,
leisure activities, a desire for challenges, and a desire for causing destruction, see Howard (1997).
7 It can more generally be written as hi ¼ ktmi =ðktmi þ kTmi Þ, where k and m are parameters.
Another example is the logit or diﬀerence form where hi ¼ emti=ðemti þ emT i Þ.
and thus less likely to be aﬀected by budget constraints. Second, and most
importantly, for the substitution eﬀect we focus explicitly on how the agent
makes a tradeoﬀ between attacking several ﬁrms. For two ﬁrms this is accom-
plished by setting Tj = T  Ti, letting Ti be the free variable, and diﬀerentiating
oU/oTi = 0. With a variable expenditure aTi + aTj, there are two free variables,
and the substitution eﬀect cannot be analyzed unless a budget constraint is
introduced. Third, if aT at least to some extent is labor expenditure, such labor
expenditure for the agent is unlawful. Whereas a ﬁrm may more easily hire and
ﬁre labor, an agent trained in unlawful behavior, and possibly burdened by a
criminal record, may not that easily ﬁnd alternative outlets for his eﬀort. If so,
his working capacity is his eﬀort which may be constant to a larger extent than
for each ﬁrm. Fourth, a variable expenditure for the agent less easily facilitates
analytical solutions.
Firm i invests ti in technology to maximize proﬁt ui, that is
oui
oti
¼ 0) ti ¼
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Especially prominent in Eqs. (4) and (5) are the ratios ri/ci and R/an. On the one 
hand ri/ci is the ratio of ﬁrm i’s asset and investment ineﬃciency, or the product 
of ﬁrm i’s asset and investment eﬃciency. On the other hand, insert-
ing (2) into (3) gives ui = h
iri  citi, which gives oui/ohi = ri and oui/oti =  ci.
Dividing the ﬁrst with the latter gives (oui/oh
i)/(oui/oti) = ri/ci which is the
percentage of the marginal utility from increased successful defense to the
marginal disutility from incremental investment cost. A similar concept in
economics is termed the marginal rate of substitution (MRS): the amount
of good x that the consumer must be given to compensate him for a one-unit
marginal reduction in his consumption of good y. Here ri/ci = (oui/oh
i)/(oui/
oti) means the amount of security success that the ﬁrm must get to compen-
sate for the ﬁrm’s marginal expenditure in security investment, similar to the
concept of required rate of return from security investment. The ratio R/an is
on the one hand the agent’s resource divided by his ineﬃciency and divided
by the number of ﬁrms. On the other hand, (1) states that the agent’s attack
equals T = R/a. Dividing both sides with n gives T/n = (1/n)R/a which can be
interpreted as the average level of attack on each ﬁrm, when there are n
ﬁrms.8
Proposition 1. (i) Firm i invests in security technology when the required rate of
return from security investment exceeds the average attack level, i.e. when r/
c > R/an. Otherwise firm i does not invest in security technology. (ii) The agent
attacks if rcn > Ra, and does otherwise not attack.
By comparing the required rate of return from security investment with the
average attack level, ﬁrm i knows whether to invest or not, and using (5)
the ﬁrm knows how much it shall invest, the proﬁt it earns, and the proﬁt the
agent earns. Proposition 1 can also be formulated such that ﬁrm i invests in
security technology when the ratio of its asset and investment ineﬃciency is
larger than the ratio of the agent’s resource and investment ineﬃciency divided
by the number of ﬁrms. A ﬁrm must have a suﬃciently large asset for it to be
worthwhile defending it, and the investment ineﬃciency must not be too large.
If the resource of the agent is too large, the ﬁrm does not defend, unless the
agent’s transformation ineﬃciency a is high or many ﬁrms are attacked in
parallel (n is large) which decreases the attack on each ﬁrm. Of course, the agent
may single out one ﬁrm, or a subset of ﬁrms, for attack. In that case (5) applies
for n = 1 or for the subset of n chosen. No security investment is not
counterintuitive against an overwhelming threat. As an example, a ﬁrm’s
investment into a security code is wasted if the agent’s resource is such that it
almost eﬀortlessly can break the code. In this case the ﬁrm may as well refrain
from developing the code. The agent attacks if the ﬁrms are valuable, their
investment ineﬃciencies are low, and there are many ﬁrms (rcn is large), as
compared with the agent’s resource and transfor-mation ineﬃciency (Ra). If the
formal control requirements dictate invest-ment, the ﬁrms will nevertheless
invest to avoid an even larger loss in terms of ﬁnes and sanctions. However,
pragmatic control requirements are not suﬃcient to justify investment if the
required rate of return is lower than the average level of attack.
Proposition 2. Firm i’s security technology investment increases concavely in the
required rate of return from security investment r/c, and is inverse U shaped in the
average level of attack R/an. Maximum investment ti = r/4c giving utility ui = r/4
occurs when R/an = r/4c, which is 25% of the required rate of return.8 I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for suggesting these two interpretations of ri/ci and
R/an.
As a ﬁrm’s asset becomes more valuable, defending it becomes more impor-
tant, and the ﬁrm increases its security investment. There is diminishing mar-
ginal return on investing in security. Each ﬁrm invests maximally in security
when the average level of attack is 25% (that is, 1/4) of the ﬁrm’s required rate
of return from security investment r/c. The ﬁrm ﬁnds that this large investment
is an appropriate counterweight to the agent’s attack, and the defense expendi-
ture is acceptable. The inverse U shape in the average level of attack R/an
means that if R/an is lower than 25% of r/c (the agent’s resource R is low,
or a or n is high), then there is no need for each ﬁrm to invest signiﬁcantly
in security since the agent constitutes no signiﬁcant threat on each ﬁrm’s asset.
Conversely, if R/an is higher than 25% of r/c, then the threat on each ﬁrm’s
asset is so high that each ﬁrm chooses low investment since a higher expendi-
ture is not justiﬁed by the beneﬁt. This means that the ﬁrm ﬁnds the threat
overwhelming, and partly gives up ﬁghting against it.
Let us compare this result with Gordon and Loeb’s (2002) analysis. They
consider two classes of security breach functions,9 and analyze how a ﬁrm’s 
security investment depends on its vulnerability. For both classes there is no
investment if the vulnerability is below a certain level. For the ﬁrst class the
investment increases concavely. For the second class the investment is inverse U
shaped, and equals zero for a suﬃciently high vulnerability. Tanaka and
Matsuura (2005) and Tanaka et al. (2005) ﬁnd support for the second class,
considering computer viruses attacking Japanese ﬁrms, and measuring the vul-
nerability level as the number of e-mail accounts. Proposition 2 can be said to be
compatible with the second class if we interpret a ﬁrm to be more vulnerable if
the agent’s resource is higher (or if the transformation ineﬃciency is lower or if
fewer ﬁrms are under attack).4. Income eﬀect and ﬁxed distributed attack for n equivalent ﬁrms
One way of increasing the pressure on the agent is to assume that the agent’s
ability to attack gets reduced dependent on the ﬁrms’ security investments.
Such reduction can occur in three manners. The ﬁrst is that a ﬁrm’s security
investment decreases the agent’s eﬃciency in attacking through increasing
the transformation ineﬃciency a, in other words, oa/oti > 0. Since the ﬁrms’
security investments increase a which reduces the agent’s transformation abil-
ity, the attack T = R/a will be reduced.10 The second is that a ﬁrm’s security
investment decreases or erodes the agent’s resource R, in other words, oR/
oti < 0. The third is that a ﬁrm’s security investment eliminates parts of the9 Hausken (2006) extends to six classes.
10 I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for pointing out that this ﬁrst manner of reduction
can be referred to as an income eﬀect.
agent’s resource R, which amounts to subtracting a term from the agent’s ini-
tial resource. We refer to these three manners of reduction as the income eﬀect
since the agent’s eﬃciency is reduced, or his available resources are reduced, or
parts of his resources are taken out of circulation. The ﬁrst two manners of
reduction have an impact that was analyzed in Section 3, simply increasing a
or decreasing R. No further analysis of the ﬁrst two manners is necessary. This
section focuses on the third manner where parts of the agent’s resource is taken
out of circulation.
Firms’ security investments in antivirus, intrusion detection systems, ﬁre-
walls, virtual private networks, and access control may reduce the agent’s
income in all these three manners. All three interpretations can be given for
some or most security investments. For example, assume that a ﬁrm’s security
investments make parts of the agent’s scanning tools or other attack equipment
obsolete, or that a new ﬁrewall makes some equipment or competence by the
agent useless.11 For concreteness, assume that the agent has two tools labeled
A and B. Tool A runs through all combinations of 16 digit passwords and
makes an entry into a system when the correct password is found. Tool B
has some other function. Without security investment, assume the agent can
use both tools A and B. Assume that the ﬁrm’s security investment abandons
all 16 digit passwords in favor of more sophisticated security. That tool A
becomes useless in this manner can mean that the agent’s eﬃciency gets
reduced (ﬁrst interpretation) since he can now only use tool B, that his resource
gets reduced (second interpretation), and that parts of his resource (tool A) gets
eliminated (third interpretation). Regarding the third interpretation, abandon-
ing 16 digit passwords is not equivalent to conﬁscating tool A from the agent.
However, since tool A is now useless for the agent, the impact for all practical
purposes is such that tool A might as well have been conﬁscated. Parts of the
agent’s resource is thus eliminated.
Let us consider an analogy. Applying the income eﬀect to terrorism, Enders
and Sandler (2003) refer to ‘‘freezing terrorist’s assets’’ which ‘‘reduces their
‘war chest’ and their overall ability to conduct a campaign of terror’’. This cor-
responds to our third interpretation. One way to freeze a terrorist’s assets is to
freeze his bank accounts. Governments and certain other authorities can imple-
ment such freezing for criminals and certain other individuals. This is not
equivalent to conﬁscating or appropriating the bank accounts, since the
accounts with their given holdings are still there. However, the owners of
the bank accounts cannot use the accounts, so for all practical purposes the11 Information sharing, which is a strategic complement to security investment under some
assumptions (Gal-Or and Ghose, 2003) may also eliminate parts of the agent’s resource. This may 
occur if the reporting of security breaches allows for straightforward elimination as useless some of 
the agent’s attack tools. Alternatively, Schechter and Smith (2003) show that information sharing
by ﬁrms can deter hackers.
., 
 
 
-holdings of the accounts might as well have been conﬁscated for a limited or
unlimited time. Firms’ security investments have the same impact, which is that
parts of the agent’s resource is directly or indirectly or implicitly rendered use-
less, obsolete, taken out of circulation, which for practical purposes means that
it is eliminated.
Although many of today’s cyber-security investments are less aggressive
than for anti-terrorism, this may not necessarily be so in the future. The cyber
era is currently in its early phase. We already see ﬁrms engaged in security
investment and investigation to identify and track down perpetrators. Firms
often have to incur the expense of early investigation and sometimes have to
pressure law enforcement authorities to continue criminal investigation.
Authorities occasionally conﬁscate hackers’ computers, software, and associ-
ated hacking tools, which means eliminating parts of the agent’s resource.
Firms’ security investments to combat cyber attacks may very well in the
future, possibly in more extensive liaisons with law enforcement authorities,
turn out to be more aggressive than the current war on terror in the sense of
attempting to eliminate the agent’s resource.12
Let us compare the approach in this section with that of Lakdawalla and
Zanjani (2002, 10) who show that ‘‘protection reduces the payoﬀ to terrorism’’
They deﬁne the terrorist’s proﬁt as m(A) +  D(T; s1, . . .  ,sN) s.t. A + T 6 R
where R is the resource, A is non-violent activities, T is vio-lent terror, m(A) is
concave, D() is expected damage, and si is self-protection by the N targets. They
show that ‘‘Deterrence hi.e. income reductioni takes place insofar as private self
protection raises A and lowers the total amount of violent terror
investments’’ (Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2002, p. 11). This means that the income
eﬀect analyzed by Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002) follows from substitution from
violent terror T to non-violent activities A, i n their notation.
In contrast, the income eﬀect analyzed in this article is more in the spirit of
Enders and Sandler’s (2003) approach where parts of the agent’s resource R is
eliminated. Knowledge, tools, and attack methods change and evolve rapidly
or explosively in a ﬁeld such as information security technology. Agents not
staying abreast of the development quickly get their resource base eroded.
As ﬁrms invest in security technology, and share information, parts of the
resources and competence of the external agents may become useless or obso-
lete against the ﬁrms’ new defense systems. Accordingly, we assume that the
ﬁrms’ security investments ti’s reduce the agent’s cyber war chest, that is, 
resource R so that the total attack T decreases, i.e. oT/oti < 0. In order to ana-12 An anonymous referee of this journal has argued that today’s security investments by ﬁrms do
not eliminate the agent’s resources, but rather weaken the agent’s ability and eﬃciency of attacks,
i.e. not as aggressive as in the anti-terrorism case. This section presents a more nuanced view where
three interpretations are possible.
lyze the symmetric case of n equivalent ﬁrms with assets ri = r, we let ﬁrm i
invest ti, while the n  1 other ﬁrms equally invest tj each. Each ﬁrm suﬀers
a fraction bi = 1/n of the attack T. We replace (1) with
T ¼ ½R bðti þ ðn 1ÞtjÞ=a; T i ¼ T=n; ð6Þ
where b(ti + (n  1)tj) is that part of the agent’s resource base that gets elim-
inated due to the n ﬁrms’ security investments. In equilibrium ti = tj which
gives T = [R  bnti]/a, where b is an income reduction parameter that scales
the sum of the security investments relative to the agent’s resource, so that
they get the same denomination. If b is large, the agent’s resource gets re-
duced signiﬁcantly, and the income eﬀect has impact. Inserting (6) into (3)
and diﬀerentiating ﬁrm i’s proﬁt with respect to ti, oui/oti = 0, and thereafter
setting ti = tj gives
ti ¼
ra bð2Rc=ra nþ 1Þ  2Rc=r þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b2ðn 1Þ2 þ 4Rcðan bÞða bÞ=ra
q 
2ða bÞ2cn
ð7Þ
which reduces to ti in (5) when b = 0. As b increases suﬃciently, T eventually
decreases toward zero. No matter how ﬁnitely large is the agent’s resource R,
there always exists a suﬃciently large b that eliminates it. Solving (6) and (7) for
ti = tj and T = 0 gives
T ¼ 0) b ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rac
p ﬃﬃ
r
p ) ti ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rr
p
n
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ac
p ; ui ¼ r 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rrc
p
n
ﬃﬃﬃ
a
p ; U ¼ 0: ð8Þ
Proposition 3 considers the security investment ti with no income eﬀect b = 0
and income eﬀect so large that the agent’s attack is eliminated, i.e. b ¼ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rac
p
=
ﬃﬃ
r
p
causing T = 0.
Proposition 3. (i) When b = 0, the security investment ti decreases in b when
R < ra(n  1)2/4cn, increases in b when ra(n  1)2/4cn < R < ran/c, and equals
zero when R > ran/c. (ii) When b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃrp causing T = 0, ti decreases in b
when R < ra(n  1)2/4c, and increases otherwise.
Three eﬀects operate when b = 0. First, when the agent’s resource R is
suﬃciently small, the agent does not constitute a considerable threat. As b
increases above zero, the ﬁrms immediately start to cash in on the beneﬁt
of an increased income reduction parameter. There is no longer a need to
invest a large ti, since the larger b above zero accomplishes the same for
a lower ti, through reducing the agent’s small income to an even lower level.
The exception occurs when the formal control requirements nevertheless
dictate a large investment. Second, when R is above a small level but below
a large level, the agent does constitute a considerable threat. In fact, the
threat is so large that the ﬁrms would like to invest more, which is too
expensive when b = 0. However, as b increases above zero, the ﬁrms ﬁnd
an incentive to invest since they get an immediate return on their investment
in the form of reducing the agent’s income. Third, when R is above a large
level, the agent’s threat is so overwhelming that the ﬁrms refrain from
investment. This follows from the contest success function ti/(ti + Ti) when 
Ti is extremely large. Even a very small investment ti causes the securement 
of a smaller fraction of the asset r than the expenditure ctiof such invest-
ment justiﬁes, see (3). The contest is like the one between an unarmed army
and an army with overwhelming ﬁrepower, where the weaker party gives up.
However, the large level R > ran/c is such that if each ﬁrm’s asset r is large,
or the transformation ineﬃciency a is large, or there are many ﬁrms (n is
large), or the investment eﬃciency 1/c is low, then the agent’s resource R
must be quite substantial in order for the ﬁrms to refrain from investment. For
all the three levels of R in Proposition 3(i), r, a, n play a role in the numerator,
while c plays a role in the denominator.
Proposition 3(ii) has two points rather than three since when the agent’s
resource is about to be eliminated causing zero attack T = 0, zero invest-
ment is no option for the ﬁrms. This follows from the contest success func-
tion ti/(ti + Ti) which equals one when Ti = 0. First, when the agent’s 
resource R is below R = ra(n  1)2/4c, which is n times larger than the low-est 
R-level in Proposition 3(i), the ﬁrms’ investment decreases in b. The intu-ition
follows from the mathematical logic of the contest success function. When the
agent’s resource is suﬃciently reduced, the ﬁrms can relax their
investment. The analogy in war is to start withdrawing forces when the
enemy is far weaker and about to go extinct. For a large b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃrp ,
the ﬁrms nevertheless have to keep a certain investment to ensure that
the attack gets virtually eliminated. This follows from ti/(ti + Ti) where a
slightly positive Ti is not acceptable when b is large. As b increases above
this level, the ﬁrms have to keep their investment intact to ensure that
the agent does not revert to attacking. Second, when the agent’s resource
R is above R = ra(n  1)2/4c, the threat is so substantial that the ﬁrms still
cash in on larger b’s, and are unwilling to invest heavily unless a suﬃciently
large b ensures a return on their investment. This return is required despite
the fact that the agent’s resource is about to be eliminated. Consequently,
ﬁrms increase their investment all the way up to the point where the exter-
nal threat is eliminated.
here PW asp roposition 3 considers the lower and upper cases b = 0 and
b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃr, Proposition 4 speciﬁes what happens in between. The inequality
ra(n  1)2/4c < ran/c holds when n 6 5, so we distinguish between n 6 5 and
n > 5. The intuition for Proposition 4 follows from Proposition 3, applying the
logic of interpolation.
Proposition 4-1. Assume n 6 5. (i) WhenR < ra(n  1)2/4cn, ti decreases through-
out in b. (ii) When ra(n  1)2/4cn < R < ra(n  1)2/4c, ti is inverse U shaped. (iii)
When ra(n  1)2/4c < R < ran/c, ti increases throughout. (iv) When R > ran/c, tiﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rac
p
=
ﬃﬃ
r
p
,equals zero when 0 6 b < b*, and increases throughout when b < b < 
where b* is defined in (A.4).
Proposition 4-2. Assume n > 5. (i) When R < ra(n  1)2/4cn, ti decreases
throughout in b. (ii) When ra(n  1)2/4cn < R < ran/c, ti is inverse U shaped.
(iii) When ran/c < R < ra(n  1)2/4c, ti equals zero when 0 6 b < b*, and is
inverse U shaped when b < b <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rac
p
=
ﬃﬃ
r
p
. (iv) When R > ra(n  1)2/4c, ti
equals zero when 0 6 b < b*, and increases throughout when b < b <ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rac
p
=
ﬃﬃ
r
p
.
First, a low R causes the ﬁrms to decrease their investment along the entire
range of b. The agent is a small threat, and the ﬁrms enjoy the increased b by
cashing in on this beneﬁt up to the point where the external threat is eliminated
and T = 0. Second, an intermediate R causes ti to increase when b increases
from zero, and decrease when b approaches the upper extreme. This gives a
maximum for ti when b is between zero and the upper extreme, and an inverse
U shape. Third, assume that R is large. When n 6 5, the external threat is con-
siderable, and ti increases throughout the range of b until T = 0. However,
when n > 5, ti ﬁrst increases toward a maximum, and thereafter decreases. With
more than ﬁve ﬁrms, the agent’s attack gets diluted, and the ﬁrms can ease up
on their security investment as T approaches zero. Fourth, when R is veryFig. 1. Security investment ti and attack T for R = 1,25/6,16,24, r = 4, a = c = 1, n = 6.
 
 
 
 
 large, the external threat is overwhelming and the ﬁrms refuse to invest in secu-
rity when b is small. But regardless how large is R, as long as it is ﬁnite, there
always exists a suﬃciently large income reduction parameter b where ti can be
invested by n ﬁrms to eliminate the external threat. The investment eventually
increases throughout until T = 0.
Fig. 1 illustrates Proposition 4 for four values of R, assuming r = 4 ,  a = c 
= 1 ,  n = 6. The security investment ti is shown with ﬁlled symbols (box, star, 
triangle, diamond), and the attack T with unﬁlled symbols. Division of T with 
1.5, 3, 10, 15 is for scaling purposes. The ﬁrst curve sets R = 1 which is well 
below ra(n  1)2/4cn = 25/6. In accordance with Proposition 4(i) ti decreases
throughout. For b = 0 the investment is ti = 0.65 and the proﬁt is ui = 2.53.
The upper value b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃrp ¼ 1=2 causing T = U = 0 gives ti = 0.33 and
ui = 3.67. The income eﬀect for R = 1 allows the six ﬁrms to cut their security 
investment in half, while earning a 45% higher proﬁt, which eliminates the 
external threat. Table 1 shows these values for R = 1 and three higher values of 
R.
The four leftmost columns show ti,ui,T,U without the income eﬀect, b = 0.
The next two columns show ti and ui when the income eﬀect has eliminated the
external threat causing T = U = 0, which means b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃrp listed in the
rightmost column. The second column from the right shows b* when it applies.
The second curve in Fig. 1 sets R = 25/6 which is exactly the transition value R =
ra(n  1)2/4cn from (i) to (ii) in Proposition 4. The curve for ti starts out
horizontally from b = 0 since the derivative of ti equals zero, and thereafter
decreases. The ti values are larger and the ui values are lower than for R = 1  
since the attack is larger.
The third curve in Fig. 1 sets R = 16 which is below ran/c = 24. Hence Prop-
osition 4(ii) applies, ti is inverse U shaped, and the attack is eliminated when
b = 2. For b = 0 the investment is lower than when R = 1, only ti = 0.60. Secu-
rity investment is costly when there is no income eﬀect and thus no hope of
reducing or eliminating the attack. As b increases from 0 to 2, the proﬁt
increases substantially from 0.13 to 2.67.
The fourth curve in Fig. 1 sets R = 24 which is exactly the transition value R 
= ran/c from (ii) to (iv) in Proposition 4. The external threat is now so sub-
stantial that the ﬁrms do not invest when b < b* = 2an/(n + 1) = 1.71, deter-
mined from Eq. (A.5). When R is only marginally below 24, ti is positive for 
all b P 0. When R = 2 4 and  b > b*, ti increases substantially, is inverse U
shaped, but eventually decreases only marginally toward ti = 1.63 when 
n = 2.45. That ti increases steeplier when R = 24 than when R = 16 follows 
from the form of the contest success function, ti/(ti + Ti), where a large Ti 
requires a large ti for it to be worthwhile for the ﬁrms to incur the cost of secu-
rity investment.
Table 1
Values of ti, ui, T, U for various b when R = 1,25/6,16,24, r = 4, a = 1, c = 1, n = 6
b = 0 b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃrp ; T ¼ U ¼ 0 b* b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃrp
ti ui T U ti ui
R = 1 0.65 2.53 1 4.90 0.33 3.67 N/A 0.5
R = 25/6 0.97 1.36 4.17 10 0.68 3.32 N/A 1.02
R = 16 0.60 0.13 16 19.60 1.33 2.67 N/A 2
R = 24 0 0 24 24 1.63 2.37 1.71 2.45
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5. Interdependence eﬀect
When ﬁrms are interconnected on a common platform or network such as in
a supply chain where upstream suppliers are connected via electronic data
interchanges (EDI) to downstream manufacturers or retailers (which is an
example of interdependent security), a security vulnerability in either the
upstream or downstream ﬁrm can also impact the other ﬁrms. Consider the fol-
lowing scenario. Firm j is breached by a group of hackers and since ﬁrm i is
connected to ﬁrm j through a common network (e.g. a virtual private network)
it is also susceptible to a breach through the network. Now if ﬁrm i has invested
in the best anti-intrusion technologies (for simplicity let us imagine installation
of the most expensive ﬁrewalls at the edges – routers and switches), it is less
likely to be hacked. Thus, the probability that ﬁrm i gets breached because
its security risks are interdependent with ﬁrm j is likely to be dependent on
the security investments made by both itself and the rival ﬁrm. Further the
extent of the indirect attack would also depend on how closely connected the
two ﬁrms are.13
Kunreuther and Heal (2003) ignore the income eﬀect and substitution eﬀect
and focus on the interdependence eﬀect where one target’s defense beneﬁts all
targets. Examples occur within the airline industry, computer networks, ﬁre
protection, theft protection, bankruptcy protection, vaccinations. Kunreuther
and Heal (2003, 232) illustrate13 I a‘‘by reference to an airline that is determining whether to install a bag-
gage checking system voluntarily. In making this decision it needs to bal-
ance the cost of installing and operating such a system with the reduction
in the risk of an explosion from a piece of luggage not only from the pas-
sengers who check in with it, but also from the bags of passengers who
check in on other airlines and then transfer to it’’.A given airline beneﬁts if all other airlines install baggage checking systems
since then all bags transferred from other airlines are secure. The airline usually
ﬁnds an interest in installing its own baggage checking system, but there is a
free rider dilemma in who shall take on the cost of security investment.
In this interdependent case both ﬁrms usually ﬁnd an interest in security
investments, but there is a free rider dilemma in who shall take on the expen-
diture fi of security investment. There is no free rider dilemma regarding the
beneﬁts. That is, ﬁrm i’s share hi of the asset ri increases in both ti and tj,
ohi/oti > 0 and oh
i/otj > 0, in contrast to oh
i/otj = 0 in (2). In this section we
alter the contest success function hi in (2) and substitute the proﬁts in (3) withm indebted to an anonymous referee of this journal for the formulation in this paragraph.
ui ¼ ti þ atjti þ T i þ aðtj þ T jÞ ri  citi;
U ¼ T i þ aT j
ti þ T i þ aðtj þ T jÞ ri þ
T j þ aT i
tj þ T j þ aðti þ T iÞ rj  aT ; ð9Þ
where a is the interdependence parameter, a 6 1. The interdependence a can be 
negative, but the contest success in (9) cannot be negative. With no interdepen-
dence, a = 0 ,  (9) reduces to (3). At the other extreme, maximum interdepen-
dence and a = 1, the two ﬁrms are so intertwined or interdependent that an 
attack on one is tantamount to an attack on the other. In this case one ﬁrm’s 
security investment defends both ﬁrms equally eﬀectively, and the attack on 
one ﬁrm impacts both ﬁrms. Think e.g. of a Trojan Horse or self-replicating 
malevolent virus unleashed on one ﬁrm. If two ﬁrms are 100% interdependent, 
the Trojan Horse or virus spreads eﬀectively throughout both ﬁrms.
Setting the derivatives of ui with respect to ti, and uj with respect to tj, equal
to zero, oui/oti = 0 and ouj/otj = 0, applying (1) and solving with respect to ti
and tj gives
ti ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ri=ci
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
aþ b abp  a ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃrj=cjp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1 ð1 aÞbph i
1 a2 
Rb
a
; ð10Þ
where tj follows by permuting the indices and substituting b with 1  b. The
proﬁts ui and U are found by inserting into (9). The symmetric case, ri = rj = r,
ci = cj = c, b = 1/2 gives
ti ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R
2a
r ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r
cð1þ aÞ
r

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R
2a
r !
; ui ¼ r  ð2þ aÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rrc
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2að1þ aÞp þ
Rc
2a
;
T i ¼ R
2a
; U ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2Rrcð1þ aÞ
a
r
 R ð11Þ
which reduces to (5) when a = 0 and n = 2.
Proposition 5. (i) Firm i invests in security technology when the required rate of
return from security investment, divided by 1 + a, exceeds the average attack
level, i.e. when r/(c(1 + a)) > R/an. Otherwise firm i does not invest in security
technology. (ii) The agent attacks if 2rc(1 + a) > Ra, and does otherwise not
attack. (iii) The security investment ti decreases in a, but with a positive second
derivative, that is oti/oa < 0, o
2ti/oa
2 > 0. (iv) The profit ui decreases in a, and
with a negative second derivative, that is oui/oa < 0, o
2ui/oa
2 < 0. (v) The profit U
increases in a, in a decreasing manner, that is oU/oa > 0, o2U/oa2 < 0.
The division of r/c with 1 + a, which is larger than one and increases in
the interdependence, means that an even higher rate of return r/c is required
for ﬁrm i to invest in security. Furthermore, when the requirement is met,
ﬁrm i invests less when the interdependence is large, and earns a lower
proﬁt. This means that interdependence causes free riding, which is detri-
mental for both ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm cuts down on its own investment and pre-
fers the other to invest. The reason is that an attack on one ﬁrm is partly (to
a degree a) channeled further to the other ﬁrm, and that one ﬁrm’s defense
partly beneﬁts the other ﬁrm. This beneﬁts the agent which directs a ﬁxed
attack and earns a higher proﬁt due to lower security investment by the
ﬁrms. The multiplication of 2rc with 1 + a means that the requirement for
the agent to attack is more lenient (2rc can be lower). The agent earns a
higher utility with interdependence. The proﬁt ui for each ﬁrm decreases det-
rimentally in the interdependence parameter a. Both the ﬁrst and second
derivatives are negative. The proﬁt U for the agent increases decreasingly
with interdependence.6. Substitution eﬀect when agent moves ﬁrst
In Sections 3–5 the agent makes attacks with T deﬁned as T = R/a, but makes
no strategic decision. In this section the agent makes a strategic decision about
how to substitute his attack across the two ﬁrms. For analytical tractability, the
substitution eﬀect requires a two-stage game. The agent moves in the ﬁrst stage
deciding the substitution dependent on the ﬁrms’ investment decisions ti and tj 
in the second stage. The two ﬁrms move in the second stage. The second stage is
solved ﬁrst. Although the games in Sections 3–5 are one-stage games, these can
be conceived as two-stage games where T is determined dependent on ti and tj in 
the ﬁrst stage (without the agent making a strategic decision), and the ﬁrms’
investment decisions ti and tj are made in the second stage. This allows compar-
ing the results in this section with the results in Sections 3–5.
Enders and Sandler (2003) describe for terrorism the substitution eﬀect as
follows:
‘‘If a government action increases the resource outlays necessary to
undertake a particular type of operation, then there is a motive to substi-
tute into some less costly operation that achieves a similar outcome at less
cost. For example, the installation of screening devices in US airports in
January 1973 made skyjackings more diﬃcult, thus encouraging terrorists
to substitute into other kinds of hostage missions or to stage a skyjacking
from an airport outside of the United States’’.Comparing the income (deterrence) and substitution (displacement) eﬀect
Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002, p. 11) state that
‘‘displacement dominates the deterrence eﬀect in the sense that protection
by one target increases the terror investments directed at other targets.
This follows directly from the concavity of the problem. Intuitively,
protection by one target lowers the return to attacking that target, 
but raises the relative return to investments in A and investments in
attacking all other targets. Therefore, while private protection
lowers the total resources devoted to terrorism T, it still creates
negative externalities for other targets by exposing them to more terror
risk’’.This statement is correct for Lakdawalla and Zanjani’s (2002) model, but not
for our model which allows raising the income reduction parameter b arbi-
trarily much without aﬀecting substitutions. The income and substitution eﬀects
depend on each other in Lakdawalla and Zanjani’s (2002) model, and are
independent in our model. If b is suﬃciently large, investment (protection) by
one ﬁrm may lower the resource of the agent so much that the other ﬁrm enjoys
a lower attack.
We may distinguish between three kinds of substitutions performed by
the agent. The ﬁrst is to adjust the attacks Ti and Tj against the two ﬁrms
optimally dependent on all the characteristics of the two ﬁrms. The second,
applicable when attacks and investments are multi-dimensional, is to substi-
tute optimally between attack tools dependent on the ﬁrms’ characteristics
and how much each ﬁrm invests along each dimension. That is, if one ﬁrm
invests heavily in employing security experts and developing intrusion detec-
tion systems, but designs a poor ﬁrewall, the agent may exploit the fact that
the ﬁrm has a poorly designed ﬁrewall. The third is substitutions through
time, compiling and accumulating resources during times when investments
ti and tj are high, awaiting times when, hopefully, ﬁrms may relax their
eﬀorts and choose lower investments ti and tj. We focus on the ﬁrst case
where attacks and investments are one-dimensional. In this section we
ignore the income eﬀect which allows no analytical solution to the ﬁrst
order conditions when the ﬁrms are diﬀerent. The ﬁrms need to be diﬀerent
in at least one respect in order for the agent to decide on a substitution. For
two equivalent ﬁrms the agent is indiﬀerent about substitutions. A plausible
method for the agent is to set Tj = T  Ti and perform the diﬀerentiation
oU/oTi = 0. This gives maximum proﬁt through optimal allocation between
Ti and Tj accounting for the two ﬁrms’ security investments, investment
ineﬃciencies, and assets.
Ceteris paribus, if ﬁrm i increases its investment ti, then the agent per-
forms some substitution of his attack from ﬁrm i to ﬁrm j, decreasing Ti
and increasing Tj, realizing that ﬁrm i becomes a more diﬃcult target, that
is oTi/oti < 0, oTj/oti > 0. Firm i increases ti if the increased share h
i of the
asset ri, due to the reduced Ti, exceeds the increased expenditure f
i of secu-
rity investment. The investment ti has a deterrent impact on the agent. In
this section we determine the equilibrium investments ti and tj for the two
ﬁrms, and the equilibrium attack Ti, assuming that the agent performs sub-
stitutions between Ti and Tj when the sum Ti + Tj = T is ﬁxed as in (1).
Consider a two-stage game where the agent moves ﬁrst. The two ﬁrms move
second, simultaneously, determining ti and tj for given Ti and Tj, where Tj = R/
a  Ti. The second stage is solved ﬁrst for ti and tj as functions of Ti. Thereafter
the ﬁrst stage is solved where the agent chooses Ti to maximize proﬁt. As
proved in Appendix, the investments and proﬁts are
ti ¼ ri
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ciri þ cjrjp 1
ci
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ciri þ cjrjp
 !
; T i ¼ ciriR=aciri þ cjrj ; ð12Þ
ui ¼ ri 1þ c
2
i R=a
ciri þ cjrj 
2ci
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ciri þ cjrjp
!
; U ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ciri þ cjrj
p R; ð13Þ
where tj and uj are found by permuting the indices. Interestingly, (12) reduces
to (5) for the symmetric case when ri = rj = r, ci = cj = c, ti = tj.
We henceforth introduce a new subscript f to signify investments tif and tjf 
and attacks Tif and Tjf for the two stage game where the agent moves ﬁrst, and 
the ﬁrms move second. Similarly, we introduce the subscript n to signify invest-
ments tin and tjn and attacks Tin and Tjn for the one stage game analyzed in Sec-
tions 4 and 5 with no substitution eﬀect.
Proposition 6. (i) Firm i’s security investment cost ti increases in ri and decreases
in ci. (ii) The attack Ti on firm i increases in the product ciri. (iii) When ci = cj = c
and the substitution effect operates and the agent moves first, firm i with a larger
asset, ri > rj, invests more in security than what the other firm j does in two
equivalent firms with and without the substitution effect, tif > tjf and tif > tjn.
Furthermore, firm i suffers a larger attack than what firm j does with and without
the substitution effect, Tif > Tjf and Tif > Tjn. (iv) When ci = cj = c and the
substitution effect operates and the agent moves first, firm i invests more in
security than what the same firm i does in two equivalent firms without the
substitution effect, tif > tin, given thatﬃﬃﬃ
ri
c
r
>
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ri
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ri þ rjp þ 1
  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R
2a
r
and ri > rj: ð14Þ
Furthermore, firm i suffers a larger attack with than without the substitution ef-
fect, Tif > Tin, when ri > rj.
Proposition 6(i) states that a valuable ﬁrm (ri is high) with high investment 
eﬃciency (1/ci is high) incurs a higher security investment cost. Then ﬁrm i is 
worth defending, its investment is eﬃcient, and it is willing to incur the cost.
Conversely, a ﬁrm with high investment ineﬃciency (ci is high) incurs a lower 
security investment cost. Proposition 6(ii) states that ﬁrm i attracts a large
attack (Ti is high) if it is valuable (ri is high) and has high investment ineﬃ-
ciency (ci is high). Then the agent considers ﬁrm i as an attractive target, and as
an easy prey. In this case the agent substitutes an optimal part of its attack
away from ﬁrm j, in order to focus more on attacking ﬁrm i. In other words,
a more valuable ﬁrm suﬀers a larger attack, and a ﬁrm with a high investment
ineﬃciency suﬀers a larger attack. The ﬁrst point is as important as the second.
If one ﬁrm is x times more valuable than the other ﬁrm, but has an investment
ineﬃciency that is a fraction 1/x of the ineﬃciency of the other ﬁrm, the sub-
stitution eﬀect causes, ceteris paribus, equally large attacks on the two ﬁrms.
The reason is that the ﬁrst ﬁrm’s substantial security investment deters the
agent which has nothing to gain by attacking the ﬁrst ﬁrm more than the
second.
Proposition 6(iii) compares one ﬁrm with the substitution eﬀect with the
other ﬁrm with and without the substitution eﬀect. The substitution eﬀect
causes a larger attack on the more valuable ﬁrm, and that ﬁrm invests more
in security than the other ﬁrm.
Proposition 6(iv) compares one ﬁrm with the substitution eﬀect with the same
ﬁrm without the substitution eﬀect. In the ﬁrst case the ﬁrm faces a ﬁrm which
diﬀers from itself, which allows substitution to be meaningful. In the second
case the ﬁrm faces a ﬁrm that is equivalent to itself, which gives a comparison
benchmark. The substitution eﬀect causes a larger attack on the more valuable
ﬁrm. The RHS of (14) approaches zero when the resource R of the agent
approaches zero. The asset ri appears both on the LHS and RHS of (14). The 
RHS appearance is both in the numerator and denomina-tor. Hence (14) is
satisﬁed if ri is suﬃciently large, regardless how large is R.Fig. 2. Lower value riL of ﬁrm i for security investment to occur with substitution. Eﬀect, R =
1/2,1,2,3, a = c = 1.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 The intuition is that the substitution eﬀect causes the agent to direct its attack
against the more valuable asset which needs to be protected. This means that
ﬁrm i must be suﬃciently valuable for the security investment to be larger
with than without the substitution eﬀect. It is quite possible that ﬁrm i is
more valuable than ﬁrm j, that ﬁrm i suﬀers a larger attack due to the sub-
stitution eﬀect, but that it invests less than without the substitution eﬀect.
Without the substitution eﬀect ﬁrm i merely considers beneﬁt versus cost fac-
ing a ﬁxed attack. With the substitution eﬀect ﬁrm i considers beneﬁt versus
cost while additionally accounting for a variable attack where the agent sub-
stitutes. This gives a diﬀerent optimization scenario. The expenditure of secu-
rity investment is subtracted linearly, while the beneﬁt is determined by the
ratio in the contest success function which does not operate linearly, and
which is especially sensitive to the resource R of the agent. Firm i may decide
to cut down on its security investment if the attack is overwhelming. We deﬁne
riL as the value of ri where (14) holds as an equality. When ri is larger than this
value, (14) holds as an inequality. Fig. 2 illustrates riL as a function of the asset rj
of the other ﬁrm when R =  1/2 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,  a = c = 1. The straight line shows riL =
rj. When rj = 2 and R is small, e.g. R = 1/2, the requirement for ri is ri > riL =
0.76, which is satisﬁed since we require ri > rj. When rj = 2  and R is large, e.g. R
= 2, the requirement is ri > 4.79 = riL in order so that ﬁrm i invests more in
security with the substitution eﬀect than without it. In contrast, when rj < ri < riL
= 4.79, ﬁrm i invests less with the substitution eﬀect than without it. The reason
is that the external threat is overwhelming, and the more valuable ﬁrm i suﬀers
more of the attack when the substitution eﬀect operates. When ri is large, ﬁrm i
suﬀers even more of the attack than ﬁrm j when the substitution eﬀect operates,
but the threat is no longer over-whelming, and ﬁrm i decides to ﬁght it through a
larger investment than without the substitution eﬀect.7. Interdependence and substitution eﬀects when agent moves ﬁrst
Analyzing the income eﬀect, as presented in Section 4 where parts of the
agent’s resource is eliminated by applying the parameter b, together with the
interdependence eﬀect or the substitution eﬀect is not analytically tractable.
However, analyzing the interdependence and substitution eﬀects is analyti-
cally tractable. The income eﬀect can also be accounted for by considering
the increase in the transformation ineﬃciency a, or decrease in the resource
R, as pointed out in the beginning of Section 4. The income eﬀect inter-
preted in this sense is analyzed in Section 3. This section can thus alterna-
tively be conceived as analyzing all the three eﬀects, where the impact of the
income eﬀect follows from considering the increase in a and decrease in R is
the equations and propositions in this section. Accounting for the interde-
pendence parameter a when determining the investments and proﬁts, as proved 
in Appendix, (12) and (13) generalizes to
ti ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p
ð1 aÞ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃciri þ cjrjp
ðri  arjÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ ap 
ðciri  acjrjÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ciri þ cjrjp
 !
;
T i ¼ ðciri  acjrjÞR=að1 aÞðciri þ cjrjÞ ; ð15Þ
ui ¼ ri þ ciðciri  acjrjÞR=að1 aÞðciri þ cjrjÞ 
ci½ð2 a2Þri  arj
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p
ð1 aÞ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ1þ ap ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃciri þ cjrjp ;
U ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ciri þ cjrj
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ a
p
 R: ð16Þ
Using from (1) that Ti = bR/a where bi = b, applying the second equation in
(15) implies b = (ciri  acjrj)/[(1  a)(ciri + cjrj)]. Inserting this value of b into
(10) gives the ﬁrst equation in (15). This means that the results for the interde-
pendence and substitution eﬀects are equivalent to the results for the interde-
pendence eﬀect when the appropriate b for the substitution is chosen.
Inserting ri = rj = r and ci = cj = c into b = (ciri  acjrj)/[(1  a)(ciri + cjrj)]
gives b = 1/2. Inserting the parameter values for this symmetric case into (15)
and (16) gives (10).
Eq. (15) assumes that ciriP acjrj. This inequality can be explained such that
ﬁrm i will be attacked with a large Ti if it is valuable (ri is high) or if its security
investment is ineﬃcient (ci is high). As the interdependence a increases, the
inequality becomes more strict. When the inequality is not satisﬁed, which
means that ﬁrm j is so attractive that cjrj > ciri/a, the agent attacks exclusively
ﬁrm j, setting Tj = R/a and Ti = 0.
Proposition 7. With 100% interdependence, a = 1, the substitution effect is not a
meaningful conception. Any choice 0 6 Ti,Tj 6 R/a s.t. Ti + Tj = R/a by the
agent is optimal. Firm i chooses ti ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ri=ci
p  R=a tj, and firm j chooses
tj ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R=a
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rj=cj
p  R=a ti, which is indeterminate.
When a = 1, an attack on one ﬁrm is tantamount to and thus as eﬀective as
an attack on the other ﬁrm. Hence from a substitution point of view, it does
not matter which ﬁrm the agent attacks. It may well attack ﬁrm j even when
ﬁrm i is more attractive expressed by ciri > cjrj. Hence any choice
0 6 Ti,Tj 6 R/a s.t. Ti + Tj = R/a is acceptable. Although ﬁrm i can choose
the optimal ti for a ﬁxed tj, and analogously for ﬁrm j, there is no joint solution,
leading the ﬁrms to apply other considerations. In contrast, when the interde-
pendence is arbitrarily smaller than 100%, the substitution eﬀect applies with
the solution described in this section.
8. All the three eﬀects when the ﬁrms move ﬁrst
Consider a two-stage game where the two ﬁrms move ﬁrst. The agent
moves second, determining Ti and Tj for given ti and tj. The second stage
is solved ﬁrst for Ti as a function of ti and tj. Inserting Tj = [R 
b(ti + tj)]/a  Ti into the second equation in (9) and diﬀerentiating with
respect to Ti, oU/oTi = 0, gives
T i ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
ri
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ti þ atjp R bðti þ tjÞ þ aðtj þ atiÞ
  ﬃﬃﬃﬃrjp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃtj þ atip a½R bðti þ tjÞ þ aðti þ atjÞ 
að1 aÞ ﬃﬃﬃrip ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃti þ atjp þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃrjp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃtj þ atip  :
ð17Þ
Inserting (17) into the ﬁrst equation in (9) and diﬀerentiating with respect to ti,
oui/oti = 0, gives the ﬁrst order condition
a
ﬃﬃﬃ
ri
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rj
p
Rðtj þ 2ati þ a2tjÞ  ða bÞtjðti  tjÞð1 aÞ2
 
þ 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃti þ atjp ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃtj þ atip ari½Rþ ða bÞtjð1 aÞ  cið1þ aÞ
 ½Rþ ða bÞðti þ tjÞ2

¼ 0 ð18Þ
which when a = b = 0 simpliﬁes to
atj
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
rirj
p ðR aðti  tjÞÞ þ 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
titj
p ðari½Rþ atj  ci½Rþ aðti þ tjÞ2Þ ¼ 0:
ð19Þ
The ﬁrst order condition for tj is found by permuting the indices. There is
no simple analytical solution. To compare with the earlier sections, insert-
ing ri = rj = r, ci = cj = c, and ti = tj into (19) and solving with respect to ti
gives
ti ¼ ar  4cr þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ar
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ar þ 16cRp
8ac
ð20Þ
which can be compared with
ti ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R
2a
r ﬃﬃ
r
c
r

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
R
2a
r !
ð21Þ
which follows from (12) with the same insertions, and which equals (5) when n = 
2. Eqs. (20) and (21) give the same value for ti when R = ar/2c. Figs. 3 and 4 
illustrate the security investments, attacks, and proﬁts as functions of ri when R 
= 1 , = 2 , a = c = 1 , n = 2, which satisﬁes R = ar/2c when ri = rj = r = 2. The 
subscript s on the variables refers to the two stage game in this section where the 
agent moves second, in contrast to subscript f when the agent moves ﬁrst as in 
Section 6, and subscript n for the one stage game in Sections 4 and 5 with no 
substitution eﬀect. The results are similar for both two stage games illustrating
Fig. 3. Security investments tif, tis, tin, tjf, tjs, tjn,Tif,Tis,Tin as functions of ri, R = 1, = 2, a = c = 1,
n = 2.
Fig. 4. Proﬁts uif, uis, uin, ujf,ujs, ujn, Uf, Us, Un as functions of ri, R = 1, = 2, a = c = 1, n = 2.the substitution eﬀect. Firm i’s investment tin without the substitution eﬀect 
equals zero when ri < 0.5 since the requirement ri/c > R/2a must be satisﬁed to 
ensure investment. Figs. 3 and 4 conﬁrm the results in the propositions. When
we increase R to R = 2, then tif < tin when 2 < ri < 4.79, and tif > tin when ri > 
4.79, as discussed after Proposition 6(iv).
 9. Future research and limitations of the current work
The income, interdependence, and substitution eﬀects have been analyzed
in the context of security investment. A joint treatment of security invest-
ment and information sharing in the context of the three eﬀects is compli-
cated, but future research may ﬁnd a way around this challenge. In their
Proposition 2 Gal-Or and Ghose (2005, 193) ﬁnd that ‘‘security technology
investments and security information sharing act as ‘strategic complements’’’.
In contrast, Gordon et al. (2003) assume an alternative cost function and ‘‘ﬁnd
that when ﬁrms share information, each ﬁrm has reduced incentives to invest in
information security’’. As Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) observe, ‘‘the main reason
for the diﬀerent result is the existence of the demand enhancing eﬀects of
information security sharing and technology investments in our model’’. The
validity of strategic complementarity under various assumptions should be
scrutinized in future research, preferably accounting for the three eﬀects.
This article assumes that the ﬁrms’ assets are exogenously given as in rent 
seeking. Future research may endogenize the assets into the production pro-cess 
(Hausken, 2005), to analyze how ﬁrms allocate resources into production versus 
security investment, and possibly other activities, accounting for infor-mation 
sharing. The ﬁrms are interdependent as speciﬁed by an interdepen-dence 
parameter. Each ﬁrm impacts the substitutions the external agent makes across 
ﬁrms, and impacts the agent’s income which determines the agent’s attack. Each 
ﬁrm’s main contest is with the external agent over its asset, and the contest with 
other ﬁrms is indirect. Future research may model how each ﬁrm is involved in 
two contests, one with the agent and one with the other ﬁrms. This can be done 
by considering two contest success func-tions, or by modeling various forms of 
market behavior and competition between ﬁrms. E.g., each ﬁrm may produce 
one or several products which they exchange with each other, choosing prices 
and quantities optimally. Whereas the income eﬀect has been successfully 
modeled for n ﬁrms, and the number of ﬁrms is essential for understanding the 
income eﬀect, the inter-dependence and substitution eﬀects have for analytical 
tractability reasons been analyzed only for two ﬁrms, which can be extended to 
n ﬁrms in future research. Diﬀerent kinds of security investment can be analyzed,
e.g. of defensive and oﬀensive nature.
Future research may also introduce the time dimension. The income of
ﬁrms and external agents ﬂuctuate over time, interdependence between ﬁrms
ﬂuctuate over time according to market conditions, and agents make substi-
tutions through time, sometimes accumulating resources during times when
investments are high, awaiting the optimal times for attack. Keohane and
Zeckhauser (2003) ﬁnd that the optimal control of terror stocks relies on both
periodic cleanup and ongoing abatement, a logic that applies for the
control of public bads such as pollution, and may apply also for security
investment to combat cyber attacks. The intuition is that the economy of
scale in reducing the cyber threat may make it optimal to do so only period-
ically. An example of this logic is Arrow et al.’s (1951) well-known (s, S)
model of inventory management where the optimal policy in the face of sto-
chastic demand for a product is to replenish inventory up to a level given by
S every time it falls to or below s.
Further modeling possibilities are one sided or two sided incomplete infor-
mation. The ﬁrms may be uncertain about the agent’s resource and eﬃciency of
transformation into attack, and the agent’s substitution preference across ﬁrms
and through time. The ﬁrms may be uncertain about each others’ production,
security investments, investment eﬃciencies, and information sharing. The
agent may be uncertain about the ﬁrms’ assets, production, security investment,
investment eﬃciencies, information sharing, and capacity or willingness to
withstand a cyber attack.10. Conclusion
The article considers several ﬁrms in cyber war with external intruders con-
ceived as unitary over the ﬁrms’ assets. The external agent seeks to break
through the security defense of the ﬁrms in order to appropriate assets, or to get
information that can be converted into assets. Each ﬁrm gets to keep a fraction
of its asset dependent on its security technology investment relative to the
investment of the agent.
With no eﬀects, each ﬁrm invests in security technology when the required 
rate of return from security investment exceeds the average attack level. This 
occurs when the ratio of the ﬁrm’s asset and investment ineﬃciency is larger 
than the ratio of the agent’s resource and transformation ineﬃciency divided 
by the number of ﬁrms. Otherwise there is no security investment, unless the 
formal control requirements dictate investment. Each ﬁrm’s security investment 
increases concavely in the required rate of return, and is inverse U shaped in the 
average level of attack, which is the agent’s resource divided by his trans-
formation ineﬃciency and divided by the number of ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm invests 
maximally in security when the average level of attack is 25% of the ﬁrm’s 
required rate of return from security investment.
The income eﬀect is such that the agent’s resource is not ﬁxed, but gets 
reduced by the ﬁrms’ security investments. Parts of the resource can be 
eliminated, attack tools can be made obsolete, intruder competence can be made 
useless, and the agent’s ability to convert resources into an attack can be 
reduced. The income eﬀect assumes an income reduction parameter which 
scales how much the ﬁrms’ security investments reduce the agent’s income. 
The security investments decrease in this parameter when the agent’s resource
is low, which allows ﬁrms to cash in on the income eﬀect. The agent’s income is
eventually eliminated. When the resource is intermediate, the security invest-
ments are inverse U shaped. It is comparatively expensive to invest when the
income reduction parameter is low, and the ﬁrms cash in when the income
reduction parameter is large. When the agent’s resource is large, the security
investments equal zero when the parameter is low. The ﬁrms realize that any
investment against an overwhelming threat is a waste. As the parameter
increases above a certain level, security investments increase.
When two ﬁrms are interdependent, security investment by one beneﬁts also
the other, and an attack against one impacts the other indirectly. Interdepen-
dence causes free riding. Each ﬁrm cuts down on its own investment and pre-
fers the other to invest. Consequently, the security investments decrease as the
interdependence increases. More interdependence causes lower proﬁts for the
ﬁrms and higher proﬁts for the attacking agent.
The substitution eﬀect means that the agent allocates its attack optimally
between the two ﬁrms. The distribution of the attack is no longer ﬁxed, but
endogenized. Each ﬁrm’s security investment increases in its asset and in its
investment eﬃciency. The attack against each ﬁrm increases in the product
of the ﬁrm’s asset and investment ineﬃciency. Hence the agent does not go
for the largest asset if a high investment eﬃciency ensures that it is too well
protected. The article makes a few more speciﬁc analyses of how the substitu-
tion eﬀect impacts security investment for diﬀerently sized ﬁrms.Acknowledgements
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Proposition 1 follows from requiring that ui > 0 and U > 0  i n  (5). 
Proposition 2 follows from
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Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Diﬀerentiating ti in (7) with respect to b, thereafter
setting b = 0, and equating with zero, gives
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The ﬁrst value of R in (A.2) is always less than the second value, and this
proves the ﬁrst part. The second part follows from Proposition 1. (ii) Differ-
entiating ti in (7) with respect to b, thereafter setting b ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rac
p
=
ﬃﬃ
r
p
, and
equating with zero, gives
oti
ob
				
b¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃrp ¼
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Proof of Proposition 4. (i) ti in (7) is of the ﬁrst order in b in the numerator, and
in the second order in b in the denominator. Proposition 3 implies that ti
decreases throughout when R < ra(n  1)2/4cn. (ii) Proposition 3 speciﬁes ini-
tial increase when b = 0, and eventual decrease when b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃrp , which
gives the inverse U shape. (iii) ra(n  1)2/4c < ran/c implies n2  6n + 1 < 0
which is valid when n 6 5. Proposition 3 implies that ti increases throughout.
(v) Proposition 3 implies that ti equals zero for b = 0 when ran/c < R. Inserting
the upper relevant b ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRacp = ﬃﬃrp (which causes T = 0) into the expression
inside the root in (7) gives Rc ðnþ 1Þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃrap  2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃRcp 2=r2 which is always posi-
tive. However, the expression (an  b)(a  b) inside the root in (7) is negative
when a < b < an which means that a sufﬁciently large Rc/r can cause negativity
under the root. This is prevented by requiring the expression inside the root in
(7) to be larger than zero, which implies
b2ðn 1Þ2 þ 4Rcðan bÞða bÞ
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> 0
) b > 2ac
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which deﬁnes b*. Inserting R = ran/c into (7) gives
ti ¼ raðbðnþ 1Þ  2anÞða bÞ2cn ðA:5Þ
which causes b* = 2an/(n + 1) which is larger than a when n > 1, and equal to a
when n = 1. Keeping b = b*, but increasing R above R = ran/c causes
unacceptable negativity under the root sign in (7). In this case the ﬁrm chooses
zero security investment ti = 0 since the resource of the agent is overwhelming.
That is, ti equals zero when 0 6 b < b*. Only when b > b* does the ﬁrm choose
ti > 0, and it does so as long as b <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rac
p
=
ﬃﬃ
r
p
which is the upper limit which
eliminates the agent’s resource causing T = 0. This implies that ti increases
throughout when b < b <
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Rac
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=
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. (iv) Proposition 3 implies that ti equals
uals ze o wzero for b = 0 when ran/c < R. Proposition 4(v) implies that ti eq r hen
0 6 b < b*. Proposition 3 implies that ti decreases in b when b ¼
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Rac
p
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and
R < ra(n  1)2/4c. This implies that ti is inverse U shaped when
b < b <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Rac
p
=
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r
p
and n > 5. h
Both the numerator and denominator of (7) equal zero when b = a. Apply-
ing L’Hopital’s rule twice on (7) givesb ¼ a ) ti ¼
Rc rc Ran
 
raðn 1Þ ; ui ¼
r
c  Ran
 2
nc2
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ðn 1Þ ðA:6Þwhich gives T = 0 when R/a = r/c, which gives ti = R/an and ui = r(n  1)/n.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) and (ii) follow from requiring that ui > 0 and U > 0
in (11). (iii) follows from differentiating (1 + a)1/2 in (11) once for the sign of
the ﬁrst derivative, and twice for the sign of the second derivative. (iv) and (v)
follow from differentiating ui and U. h
Proof of Eqs. (12), (13), (15), (16). It suﬃces to prove (15) and (16), from
which (12) and (13) follow from inserting a = 0. We insert Tj = R/a  Ti into the 
ﬁrst equation in (9) and differentiate with respect to ti, oui/oti = 0. We sim-ilarly 
determine ouj/otj = 0, and solve, which givesti ¼
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as the solution of the second stage, where tj is found by permuting the indices. 
For the ﬁrst stage, inserting (A.7) into the second equation in (9) and differen-
tiating with respect to Ti, oU/oTi = 0, gives the second equation in (15). Insert-
ing this value of Ti into (A.7) gives the ﬁrst equation in (15). Inserting into (9) 
gives (16).
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Diﬀerentiating ti in (12) with respect to ri and ci gives
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The negative occurrence of R inside the bracket in the expression for oti/ori
causes the bracket to be smallest when R is largest. The largest acceptable value
of R is R ¼ aðciri þ cjrjÞ=c2i , which gives ti = 0 in (12). It follows that oti/ori > 0.
(ii) Follows from the second equation in (12). h
Proof of Proposition 6(iii). Eq. (12) implies tj = (rj/ri)ti when ci = cj, which
implies tif > tjf when ri > rj. Requiring that ti = tif in (12) is larger than tj = tjn
in (4) for bi = 1/2 gives
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A weaker requirement is
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which is always satisﬁed when ri > rj. Eq. (12) with ci = cj impliesTif > Tjf when
ri > rj. Comparing this equation with the third equation in (5) when n = 2 im-
plies Tif > Tjn when ri > rj. h
Proof of Proposition 6(iv). Replacing rj with ri on the RHS of (A.9) gives
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which when applying (x2  1) = (x  1)(x + 1) can be written asﬃﬃﬃ
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which abbreviates to (14) when ri > rj. Comparing Ti in (12) with Ti in (5) im-
plies Tif > Tin when n = 2 and ri > rj. h
 
 
 Proof of Proposition 7. Inserting a = 1 into (12) and (A.7) gives zero in the
denominators. More fundamentally, applying (9) to determine oui/oti = 0
and ouj/otj = 0 gives the two indeterminate expressions for ti and tj in
Proposition 7. h
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